We study how much data a Bayesian observer needs to correctly infer the relative likelihoods of two events when both events are arbitrarily rare. Each period, either a blue die or a red die is tossed. The two dice land on side 1 with unknown probabilities p 1 and q 1 , which can be arbitrarily low. Given a datagenerating process where p 1 ≥ cq 1 , we are interested in how much data is required to guarantee that with high probability the observer's Bayesian posterior mean for p 1 exceeds (1 − δ)c times that for q 1 . If the prior densities for the two dice are positive on the interior of the parameter space and behave like power functions at the boundary, then for every ǫ > 0, there exists a finite N so that the observer obtains such an inference after n periods with probability at least 1 − ǫ whenever np 1 ≥ N. The condition on n and p 1 is the best possible. The result can fail if one of the prior densities converges to zero exponentially fast at the boundary.
Abstract. We study how much data a Bayesian observer needs to correctly infer the relative likelihoods of two events when both events are arbitrarily rare. Each period, either a blue die or a red die is tossed. The two dice land on side 1 with unknown probabilities p 1 and q 1 , which can be arbitrarily low. Given a datagenerating process where p 1 ≥ cq 1 , we are interested in how much data is required to guarantee that with high probability the observer's Bayesian posterior mean for p 1 exceeds (1 − δ)c times that for q 1 . If the prior densities for the two dice are positive on the interior of the parameter space and behave like power functions at the boundary, then for every ǫ > 0, there exists a finite N so that the observer obtains such an inference after n periods with probability at least 1 − ǫ whenever np 1 ≥ N. The condition on n and p 1 is the best possible. The result can fail if one of the prior densities converges to zero exponentially fast at the boundary.
Significance Statement. Many decision problems in contexts ranging from drug safety tests to game-theoretic learning models require Bayesian comparisons between the likelihoods of two events. When both events are arbitrarily rare, a large data set is needed to reach the correct decision with high probability. The best result in previous work requires the data size to grow so quickly with rarity that the expectation of the number of observations of the rare event explodes. We show for a large class of priors that it is enough that this expectation exceeds a prior-dependent constant. However, without some restrictions on the prior the result fails, and our condition on the data size is the weakest possible.
Introduction
Suppose a physician is deciding between a routine surgery versus a newly approved drug for her patient. Either treatment can, in rare cases, lead to a lifethreatening complication. She adopts a Bayesian approach to estimate the respective probability of complication, as is common among practitioners in medicine when dealing with rare events, see, for example, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (2000) and Thompson (2014) on the "zero-numerator problem." She reads the medical literature to learn about n patient outcomes associated with the two treatments and chooses the new drug if and only if her posterior mean regarding the probability of complication due to the drug is lower than (1 − δ) times that of the surgery. As the true probability of complication becomes small for both treatments, how quickly does n need to increase to ensure that the physician will correctly choose surgery with probability at least 1 − ǫ when surgery is in fact the safer option?
Phrased more generally, we study how much data is required for the Bayesian posterior means on two probabilities to respect an inequality between them in the data-generating process, where these true probabilities may be arbitrarily small. Each period, one of two dice, blue or red, is chosen to be tossed. The choices can be deterministic or random, but have to be independent of past outcomes. The blue and red dice land on side k with unknown probabilities p k and q k , and the outcomes of the tosses are independent of past outcomes. Say that the posterior beliefs of a Bayesian observer satisfy (c, δ)-monotonicity for sidek if his posterior mean for pk exceeds (1 − δ)c times that for qk whenever the true probabilities are such that pk ≥ cqk. We assume the prior densities are continuous and positive on the interior of the probability simplex, and behave like power functions at the boundary. Then we show that, under a mild condition on the frequencies of the chosen colors, for every ǫ > 0, there exists a finite N so that the observer holds a (c, δ)-monotonic belief after n periods with probability at least 1 − ǫ whenever npk ≥ N. This condition means that the expected number of times the blue die lands on sidek must exceed a constant that is independent of the true parameter. Examples show that the sample size condition is the best possible, and that the result can fail if one of the prior densities converges to zero exponentially fast at the boundary. A crucial aspect of our problem is the behavior of estimates when the true parameter value approaches the boundary of the parameter space, a situation that is rarely studied in a Bayesian context.
Suppose that in every period, the blue die is chosen with the same probability and that outcomek is more likely under the blue die than under the red one. Then, under our conditions, an observer who sees outcomek but not the die color is very likely to assign posterior odds ratio to blue versus red that is not much below the prior odds ratio. That is, the observer is unlikely to update her beliefs in the wrong direction. Fudenberg and He (2017) use this corollary to provide a learning-based foundation for equilibrium refinements in signalling games.
The best related result known so far is a consequence of the uniform consistency result of Diaconis and Freedman (1990) . Their result leads to the desired conclusion only under the stronger condition that the sample size is so large that the expected number of times the blue die lands on sidek exceeds a threshold proportional to 1/pk. That is, the threshold obtained from their result explodes as pk approaches zero.
Our improvement of the sample size condition is made possible by a new pair of inequalities that relate the Bayes estimates to observed frequencies. Like the bounds of Diaconis and Freedman (1990) , the inequalities apply to all sample sequences without exceptional null sets and they do not involve true parameter values. Our result is related to a recent result of Bochkina and Green (2014) which shows that, under some conditions, the posterior distribution converges faster when the true parameter is on the boundary. Our result is also related to Dudley and Haughton (2002) who consider a half-space not containing the maximum likelihood estimate of the true parameter, and study how quickly the posterior probability assigned to the half-space converges to zero.
Bayes estimates for multinomial probabilities
We first consider the simpler problem of estimating for a single K-sided die the probabilities of landing on the various sides. Suppose the die is tossed independently n times. Let X n k denote the number of times the die lands on side k. Then X n = (X n 1 , . . . , X n K ) has a multinomial distribution with parameter n ∈ N and unknown parameter p = (p 1 , . . . , p K ) ∈ ∆, where N is the set of positive integers and ∆ = {p ∈ [0, 1] K : p 1 + · · · + p K = 1}. Let N 0 = N ∪ {0}. Let π be a prior density on ∆ with respect to the Lebesgue measure λ on ∆, normalized by λ(∆) = 1/(K − 1)!. Let π(·|X n ) be the posterior density after observing X n .
Motivated by applications where some of the p k can be arbitrarily small, we are interested in whether the relative error of the Bayes estimatorp k (X n ) = p k π(p|X n ) dλ(p) is small with probability close to 1, uniformly on large subsets of ∆. Specifically, given k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and ǫ > 0, we seek conditions on n and p and the prior, so that
A subscript on P or E indicates the parameter value under which the probability or expectation is to be taken. For a wide class of priors, we show in Theorem 1 that there is a constant N that is independent of the unknown parameter so that (1) holds whenever E p (X n k ) ≥ N. Denote the interior of ∆ by int ∆.
Condition P. We say that a density π on ∆ satisfies Condition P(α), where α = (α 1 , . . . , α K ) ∈ (0, ∞) K , if π(p) K k=1 p α k −1 k is uniformly continuous and bounded away from zero on int ∆. We say that π satisfies Condition P if there exists α ∈ (0, ∞) K so that π satisfies Condition P(α).
For example, if K = 2, then π satisfies Condition P(α) if and only if π is positive and continuous on int ∆ and the limit lim p k →0 π(p)/p α k −1 k exists and is positive for k = 1, 2. For every K ≥ 2, every Dirichlet distribution has a density that satisfies Condition P. Note that Condition P does not require that the density is bounded away from zero and infinity at the boundary. The present assumption on the behavior at the boundary is similar to Assumption P of Bochkina and Green (2014) .
Theorem 1. Suppose π satisfies Condition P. Then for every ǫ > 0, there exists N ∈ N so that
The proofs of the results in this section are given in the Supporting Information. The proof of Theorem 1 uses bounds on the posterior means given in Proposition 1 below. These bounds imply that there is an N ∈ N so that if np k ≥ N and the maximum likelihood estimator 1 n X n k is close to p k , then |p k (X n ) − p k | < p k ǫ. It follows from Chernoff's inequality that the probability that 1 n X n k is not close to p k is at most ǫ.
Inequality (2) shows a higher accuracy of the Bayes estimatorp k (X n ) when the true parameter p k approaches 0. To explain this fact in a special case suppose that K = 2 and the prior is the uniform distribution. Thenp k (X n ) = (X n k + 1)/(n + 2) and the mean squared error ofp k (X n ) is [np k (1 − p k ) + (1 − 2p k ) 2 ]/(n + 2) 2 , which converges to 0 like 1 n when p k ∈ (0, 1) is fixed, and like 1 n 2 when p k = 1 n . Moreover, by Markov's inequality, the probability in (2) is less than (np k + 1)/(n 2 p 2 k ǫ 2 ), so that in this case we can choose N = 2/ǫ 3 . In general, we do not have an explicit expression for the threshold N, but in Remark 2 we discuss the properties of the prior that have an impact on the N we construct in the proof.
Condition P allows the prior density to converge to zero at the boundary of ∆ like a power function with an arbitrarily large exponent. The following example shows that the conclusion of Theorem 1 fails to hold for a prior density that converges to 0 exponentially fast. Example 1. Let K = 2, π(p) ∝ e −1/p 1 , and δ > 0. Then for every N ∈ N, there exist p ∈ ∆ and n ∈ N with n 1 2 +δ p 1 ≥ N so that P p (|p 1 (X n ) − p 1 | > p 1 ) = 1.
The idea behind this example is that the prior assigns very little mass near the boundary point where p 1 = 0, so if the true parameter p 1 is small, the observer needs a tremendous amount of data to be convinced that p 1 is in fact small. The prior density in our example converges to 0 at an exponential rate as p 1 → 0, and it turns out that the amount of data needed in order thatp 1 (X n )/p 1 is close to 1 grows quadratically in 1/p 1 . For every fixed N ∈ N and δ > 0, the pairs (n, p 1 ) satisfying the relation n 1 2 +δ p 1 = N involve a sub-quadratic growth rate of n with respect to 1/p 1 . So we can always pick a small enough p 1 such that the corresponding data size n is insufficient.
The next example shows that the sample size condition of Theorem 1, np k ≥ N, cannot be replaced by a weaker condition of the form ζ(n)p k ≥ N for some function ζ with lim sup n→∞ ζ(n)/n = ∞. Put differently, the set of p for which (2) can be proved cannot be enlarged to a set of the form {p :
Example 2. Suppose π satisfies Condition P. Let ζ : N → (0, ∞) be so that lim sup n→∞ ζ(n)/n = ∞. Then for every N ∈ N, there exist p ∈ ∆ and n ∈ N with ζ(n)p 1 ≥ N so that
The following proposition gives fairly sharp bounds on the posterior means under the assumption that the prior density satisfies Condition P. The result is purely deterministic and applies to all possible sample sequences. The bounds are of interest in their own right, and also play a crucial role in the proofs of Theorem 1 and 2.
Proposition 1. Suppose π satisfies Condition P(α). Then for every ǫ > 0, there exists a constant γ > 0 such that
for k = 1, . . . , K and all n, n 1 , . . . , n K ∈ N 0 with K i=1 n i = n. Remark 1. If π is the density of a Dirichlet distribution with parameter α ∈ (0, ∞) K , then the inequalities in (3) hold with ǫ = 0 and γ = K k=1 α k , and the inequality on the left-hand side is an equality. If π is the density of a mixture of Dirichlet distributions and the support of the mixing distribution is included in the interval [a, A] K , 0 ≤ a ≤ A < ∞, then for all k and n 1 , . . . , n K with K i=1 n i = n,
The proofs of our main results, Theorems 1 and 2, apply to all priors whose densities satisfy inequalities (3) or (4). In particular, the conclusions of these theorems and of their corollaries hold if the prior distribution is a mixture of Dirichlet distributions and the support of the mixing distribution is bounded.
Remark 2. Condition P(α) implies that the function π(p)/ K k=1 p α k −1 k , p ∈ int ∆, can be extended to a continuous functionπ(p) on ∆. The proof of Proposition 1 relies on the fact thatπ can be uniformly approximated by Bernstein polynomials. An inspection of the proof shows that the constant γ in (3) can be taken to be m + K k=1 α k , where m is so large that h m , the m-th degree Bernstein polynomial ofπ, satisfies
Hence, in addition to a small value of ǫ, the following properties of the density π result in a large value of γ: (i) if K k=1 α k is large, (ii) if π is a "rough" function so thatπ is hard to approximate and m needs to be large, and (iii) ifπ is close to 0 somewhere. The threshold N in Theorem 1 depends on the prior through the constant γ from Proposition 1 and the properties of π just described will also lead to a large value of N.
In particular, N → ∞ if K k=1 α k → ∞. For example, consider a sequence of priors π (j) for K = 2 where π (j) is the density of the Dirichlet distribution with parameter (j, 1), so that π (j) satisfies Condition P(α) with α 1 = j. As j → ∞, π (j) converges faster and faster to 0 as p 1 → 0, though never as fast as in Example 1, where no finite N can satisfy the conclusion of Theorem 1. If n = 4j and p 1 = 1 12 , then under π (j) ,p 1 (X n ) = (X n 1 + j)/(n + j + 1) ≥ 2p 1 , so for every ǫ ∈ (0, 1), the probability in Theorem 1 is 1. Thus, the smallest N for which the conclusion holds must exceed 4j × 1 12 = j 3 . Remark 3. Using results on the degree of approximation by Bernstein polynomials, one may compute explicit values for the constants γ in Proposition 1 and N in Theorem 1. Details are given in Remarks 3 ′ and 3 ′′ in Supporting Information.
Remark 4. Suppose K > 2 and the statistician is interested in only one of the probabilities p k , say pk. Then, instead of usingpk(X n ), he may first reduce the original (K − 1)-dimensional estimation problem to the problem of estimating the one-dimensional parameter (pk, k =k p k ) of the Dirichlet distribution of (X n k , k =k X n k ). He will then distinguish only whether or not the die lands on sidē k and will use the induced one-dimensional prior distribution for the parameter of interest. If the original prior is a Dirichlet distribution on ∆, both approaches lead to the same Bayes estimators for pk, but in general, they do not. Proposition 2 in the Supporting Information shows that whenever the original density π satisfies condition P, then the induced density satisfies condition P as well. However, it may happen that the induced density satisfies Condition P even though the original density does not. For example, if K = 3 and π(p) ∝ e −1/p 1 + p 2 , then π does not satisfy Condition P, but for eachk = 1, 2, 3, the induced density does.
Comparison of two multinomial distributions
Here we consider two dice, blue and red, each with K ≥ 2 sides. In every period, a die is chosen. We first consider the case where the choice is deterministic and fixed in advance. We will later allow the choice to be random. The chosen die is tossed and lands on the k-th side according to the unknown probability distributions p = (p 1 , . . . , p K ) and q = (q 1 , . . . , q K ) for the blue and the red die, respectively. The outcome of the toss is independent of past outcomes. The parameter space of the problem is ∆ 2 . The observer's prior is represented by a product density π(p)̺(q) over ∆ 2 , that is, he regards the parameters p and q as realizations of independent random vectors.
Let X n be a random vector that describes the outcomes, i.e., colors and sides, of the first n tosses. Let b n denote the number of times the blue die is tossed in the first n periods. Let π(·|X n ) and ̺(·|X n ) be the posterior densities for the blue and the red die after observing X n . Letp k (X n ) = p k π(p|X n ) dλ(p) and q k (X n ) = q k ̺(q|X n ) dλ(q). The product form of the prior density ensures that the marginal posterior distribution for either die is completely determined by the observations on that die and the marginal prior for that die.
We study the following problem. Fix a sidek ∈ {1, . . . , K} and a constant c ∈ (0, ∞). Consider a family of environments, each characterized by a datagenerating parameter vector ϑ = (p, q) ∈ ∆ 2 and an observation length n. In each environment, we have pk ≥ cqk, and we are interested in whether the Bayes estimators reflect this inequality. In general, one cannot expect that the probability thatpk(X n ) ≥ cqk(X n ) is much higher than 1 2 when pk = cqk. We therefore ask whether in all of the environments, the observer has a high probability that pk(X n ) ≥ c(1 − δ)qk(X n ) for a given constant δ ∈ (0, 1).
Clearly, as pk approaches 0, we will need a larger observation length n for the data to overwhelm the prior. But how fast must n grow relative to pk? Applying the uniform consistency result of Diaconis and Freedman to each Bayes estimator separately leads to the condition that n must be so large that the expected number of times the blue die lands on sidek, that is, b n pk, exceeds a threshold that explodes when pk approaches zero. The following theorem shows that there is a threshold that is independent of p, provided the prior densities satisfy Condition P.
Theorem 2. Suppose that π and ̺ satisfy Condition P. Letk ∈ {1, . . . , K}, c ∈ (0, ∞), and ǫ, δ, η ∈ (0, 1). Then there exists N ∈ N so that for every deterministic sequence of choices of the dice to be tossed,
for all ϑ = (p, q) ∈ ∆ 2 with pk ≥ cqk and all n ∈ N with b n pk ≥ N and b n /n ≤ 1−η.
We prove Theorem 2 in the next section.
Note that the only constraints on the sample size here are that the product of b n with pk be sufficiently large and the proportion of periods in which the red die is chosen be not too small. However, pk and qk can be arbitrarily small. This is useful in analyzing situations where the data-generating process contains rare events.
In the language of hypothesis testing, Theorem 2 says that under the stated condition on the prior, the test that rejects the null hypothesis pk ≥ cqk if and only ifpk(X n ) < c(1−δ)qk(X n ) has a type I error probability of at most ǫ provided pk ≥ N/b n (and b n /n < 1 − η). For every n, the bound on the error probability holds uniformly on the specified parameter set. Note that such a bound cannot be obtained for a test that rejects the hypothesis wheneverpk(X n ) < cqk(X n ).
We now turn to the case where the dice are randomly chosen. The probability of choosing the blue die need not be constant over time but must not depend on the unknown parameter ϑ. Let the random variable B n denote the number of times the blue die is tossed in the first n periods.
Corollary 1. Suppose that π and ̺ satisfy Condition P. Letk ∈ {1, . . . , K}, c ∈ (0, ∞), and ǫ, δ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose that in every period, the die to be tossed is chosen at random, independent of the past, and that
Then there exists N ∈ N so that
The proof of Corollary 1 is given at the end of the next section. In the decision problem described in the first paragraph of the introduction, Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 ensure that whenever surgery is the safer option, the probability that the physician actually chooses surgery is at least 1 − ǫ unless the probability of complication due to the drug is smaller than N/n. Except for this last condition, the bound 1 − ǫ holds uniformly over all possible parameters.
In the rest of this section we assume that in every period the blue die is chosen at random with the same probability µ B . The value of µ B need not be known, we only assume that 0 < µ B < 1, so that condition (6) is met.
The following example shows that the conditions on the prior densities cannot be omitted from Corollary 1.
Example 3. Suppose K = 2 and 0 < µ B < 1. Suppose π satisfies Condition P and ̺(q) ∝ e −1/q 1 . Let c > 0. Then for every N ∈ N, there exist ϑ = (p, q) ∈ ∆ 2 with p 1 ≥ cq 1 and n ∈ N with np 1 ≥ N so that
The next example shows that the sample size condition of Corollary 1, npk ≥ N, is the best possible for small pk. It cannot be replaced by a weaker condition of the form nζ(pk) ≥ N for some function ζ with lim t→0+ ζ(t)/t = ∞. In particular, taking ζ to be a constant function shows that there does not exist N ∈ N so that n ≥ N implies that (7) holds uniformly for all ϑ with p k ≥ cq k .
Example 4. Suppose that 0 < µ B < 1 and that π and ̺ satisfy Condition P. Let c > 0. Let ζ be a nonnegative function on [0, 1] with lim t→0+ ζ(t)/t = ∞.
Then there exists ǫ 0 > 0 so that for every N ∈ N, there exist ϑ = (p, q) ∈ ∆ 2 with p 1 ≥ cq 1 and n ∈ N with nζ(p 1 ) ≥ N so that
Examples 3 and 4 are proved in the Supporting Information. Suppose that after data X n the observer were told that the next outcome was k but not which die was used. Then Bayes' rule implies the posterior odds ratio for "blue" relative to "red" is
Corollary 2. Suppose that π and ̺ satisfy Condition P. Then there exists N ∈ N such that whenever pk ≥ qk and npk ≥ N, there is probability at least 1 − ǫ that the posterior odds ratio of "blue" relative to "red" exceeds (1 − ǫ) · µ B µ R when the (n + 1)-th die lands on sidek.
This corollary is used in Fudenberg and He (2017) , who provide a learningbased foundation for equilibrium refinements in signalling games. They consider a sequence of learning environments, each containing populations of "blue" senders, "red" senders, and receivers. Senders are randomly matched with receivers each period and communicate using one of K messages. There is some special messagē k, whose probability of being sent by blue senders always exceeds the probability of being sent by red senders in each environment. Suppose the common prior of the receivers satisfies Condition P and, in every environment, there are enough periods that the expected total observations of blue sender playingk exceeds a constant. Then at the end of every environment, by this corollary all but ǫ fraction of the receivers will assign a posterior odds ratio for the color of the sender not much less than the prior odds ratio of red versus blue, if they were to observe another instance ofk sent by an unknown sender, regardless of how rarely the messagek is observed. A leading case of receiver prior satisfying Condition P is fictitious play, the most commonly used model of learning in games, which corresponds to Bayesian updating from a Dirichlet prior, but our corollary shows that the Dirichlet restriction can be substantially relaxed.
Proofs of Theorem 2 and Corollary 1
We begin with two auxiliary results needed in the proof of Theorem 2. Lemma 1 is a large deviation estimate which gives a bound on the probability that the frequency of sidek in the tosses of the red die exceeds an affine function of the frequency of sidek in the tosses of the blue die. Lemma 2 implies that, with probability close to 1, the number of times the blue die lands on sidek exceeds a given number when b n pk is sufficiently large. The proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 are in the Supporting Information. Lemma 1. Let S n be a binomial random variable with parameters n and p, and let T m be a binomial random variable with parameters m and q. Let 0 < c ′ < c and d > 0. Suppose S n and T m are independent, and p ≥ cq. Then
.
Lemma 2. Let M < ∞ and ǫ > 0. Then there exists N ∈ N so that if S n is a binomial random variable with parameters n and p and np ≥ N, then
Proof of Theorem 2. Let r n = n − b n be the number of times the red die is tossed in the first n periods. Let Y n and Z n be the respective number of times the blue and the red die land on sidek. Choose β > 0 and c ′ ∈ (0, c) so that
By Proposition 1, there exists γ > 0 so that for every n ∈ N,
Let d > 0 be so that the bound in Lemma 1 satisfies (c ′ /c) c ′ d/(c ′ +1) ≤ ǫ 2 . We now show that for all b, r ∈ N, y = 0, . . . , b, and z = 0, . . . , r, the inequalities
It follows from the first and the third inequality in (10) that
Applying this result, inequality (8), twice the second and finally the fourth inequality in (10) we get proving (11) . Let N = {n ∈ N : b n /n ≤ 1 − η}, N 1 = ⌈2cγ/(c ′ δ)⌉, and for every n ∈ N with b n ≥ N 1 define the events
For all n ∈ N , b n < r n /η. Thus, if n ∈ N and b n ≥ N 1 , the implication (10) ⇒ (11) yields that
Therefore, by inequalities (9),
It follows from Lemma 1 and the definition of d that for every ϑ = (p, q) with pk ≥ cqk, P ϑ (F c n ) ≤ ǫ 2 . By Lemma 2, there exists N 2 ∈ N so that P ϑ (G c n ) ≤ ǫ 2 for all n with b n pk ≥ N 2 . Thus, if pk ≥ cqk, n ∈ N and b n pk ≥ N := max(N 1 , N 2 ), then P ϑ (pk(X n ) ≥ c(1 − δ)qk(X n )) ≥ 1 − P ϑ (F c n ) − P ϑ (G c n ) ≥ 1 − ǫ. Note that N does not depend on the sequence of the choices of the dice.
Remark 5. If K = 2, then for every n ≥ 1 and every fixed number of times the red die is chosen in the first n periods, the Bayes estimate of qk can be shown to be an increasing function of the number of times the red die lands on sidek. This fact can be combined with Theorem 1 to give an alternative proof of Theorem 2 for the case K = 2. The monotonicity result does not hold for K > 2 and our proof of Theorem 2 does not use Theorem 1.
Proof of Corollary 1. By Chebyshev's inequality, [B n − E(B n )]/n converges in probability to 0. Thus, by condition (6), there exists η > 0 and N 1 ∈ N so that the event F n = {η ≤ B n /n ≤ 1 − η} has probability P(F n ) ≥ 1 − ǫ 2 for all n ≥ N 1 . By Theorem 2, there exists N 2 ∈ N so that
for all ϑ = (p, q) ∈ ∆ 2 with pk ≥ cqk and all n ∈ N and b n ∈ {1, . . . , n} with P(B n = b n ) > 0 and b n pk ≥ N 2 and b n /n ≤ 1 − η. Let N = max(N 1 , ⌈N 2 /η⌉).
Then for every ϑ with pk ≥ cqk and every n ∈ N with npk ≥ N, F n ⊂ {B n pk ≥ N 2 , B n /n ≤ 1 − η}, so that
which implies (7) because P(F n ) ≥ 1 − ǫ 2 .
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Proofs of the results in Section 2. Before we prove Theorem 1 we prove Proposition 1 and then state and prove a simple consequence of Chernoff's inequality. Both results are needed in the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. The assumption that π(p)/ K i=1 p α i −1 i is uniformly continuous on int ∆ implies that the function has a continuous extensionπ : ∆ → R, see Dugundji (1966), Theorem 5.2, page 302. Letπ 0 = min{π(p) : p ∈ ∆}. Theñ π 0 > 0. Given ǫ > 0, choose δ ∈ (0,π 0 ) so small that
To approximate the integrals in the assertion by sums of Dirichlet integrals we use the fact that the continuous functionπ can be uniformly approximated by Bernstein polynomials, see Lorentz (1986) , pages 6 and 51. Thus, there is a polynomial
Using the formula
, s 1 , . . . , s K > 0, and the relation Γ(s + 1) = sΓ(s), we get
Since c ν > 0 for every ν, it follows that
For all p ∈ ∆, h(p) ≥π 0 , and so |π(p) − h(p)| ≤ δ ≤ δ π 0 h(p). Thus,
It follows from these inequalities together with (12) and (13) that for n, n 1 , . . . , n K ∈
Similarly, using the inequality 1/(1 + ǫ) > 1 − ǫ, we obtain
The assertion follows with γ = m + K i=1 α i .
Remark 3 ′ . Using results on the degree of approximation by Bernstein polynomials, one may compute explicit values for the constant γ in Proposition 1. If, for example, K = 2 and φ(p 1 ) =π(p 1 , 1 − p 1 ) has a continuous derivative on [0, 1], one can apply Theorem 1.6.1 in Lorentz (1986) to show that (3) holds with
If K ≥ 2 andπ coincides with a polynomial on ∆, then, by a result of Handelman (1988) , π can be written as a finite mixture of densities of Dirichlet distributions and Theorem 3 of Powers and Reznick (2001) gives a computable upper bound on the support of the mixing distribution. Thus, the inequalities in (4) hold with computable constants a and A.
Lemma 3. Let S n be a binomial random variable with parameters n and p. Let 1 < c < 2 and d > 0. Then
Proof. By Chernoff's inequality,
Thus, φ ′ is negative on (1, 2), so that φ(c) < φ(1) = 0. It now follows that ψ is decreasing on [0, 1], so that ψ(p) ≤ ψ(0) = 1. This proves the first claim. The proof of the second claim is similar.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let 0 < ǫ < 1. Choose c ∈ (1, 2) and δ > 0 so that
Let d > 0 be so that the bound in Lemma 3 satisfies e (1−c)d < ǫ 2 . By Proposition 1, there exists γ > 0 so that for every n ∈ N,
Let N be so large that
Fix k, p k and n with np k ≥ N.
Remark 3 ′′ . In the proof of Theorem 1 one can choose c = 1 + ǫ 4 , δ = ǫ 5 , and d = 3ǫ −2 . If the prior-dependent constant γ > 0 is so chosen that the inequalities in (3) hold with ǫ replaced by ǫ 5 , then it follows by a small variation of the above proof that the conclusion of Theorem 1 holds for N = 8ǫ −3 + 3γǫ −1 .
The proof of Example 1 uses the following lower bound for the Bayes estimates of p 1 . 1 0 p ν+1 (1 − p) n−ν π(p) dp 1 0 p ν (1 − p) n−ν π(p) dp ≥ 1 8 √ 1 ∨ n for every n ∈ N 0 and ν = 0, . . . , n.
Proof. Let U be a random variable with density proportional to p ν (1−p) n−ν π(p) and let V be a random variable with density proportional to (1 − p) n π(p), 0 < p < 1. Then U is larger than V in the likelihood ratio order since p ν (1−p) n−ν π(p)/[(1− p) n π(p)] = (p/(1 − p)) ν is increasing in p. This implies that E(U) ≥ E(V ), that is, 1 0 p ν+1 (1 − p) n−ν π(p) dp 1 0 p ν (1 − p) n−ν π(p) dp ≥ 1 0 p(1 − p) n π(p) dp 1 0 (1 − p) n π(p) dp , see Lehmann and Romano (2005) , page 70. It is therefore enough to prove the claim for ν = 0. Let f n (p) = c n (1 − p) n π(p), where c n = [ 1 0 (1 − p) n π(p) dp] −1 . We have
showing that f n is increasing on [0, 2a n ], where a n = 1/(4 √ 1 ∨ n). Hence 1 an f n (p) dp 1 − 1 an f n (p) dp = 1 an f n (p) dp an 0 f n (p) dp ≥ 2an an f n (p) dp a n f n (a n ) ≥ (2a n − a n )f (a n ) a n f n (a n ) = 1.
Thus 1 an f n (p) dp ≥ 1 2 , and therefore 1 0 pf n (p) dp ≥ 1 an pf n (p) dp ≥ a n 1 an f n (p) dp ≥ 1 2 a n = 1 8 √ 1 ∨ n .
Proof of Example 1. Let N ∈ N. For n > N 2 define p(n) ∈ ∆ by p 1 (n) = Nn − 1 2 −δ . By Lemma 4,p 1 (X n ) − 2p 1 (n) ≥ n − 1 2 ( 1 8 − 2Nn −δ ), and so, for n sufficiently large, P p(n) (|p 1 (X n ) − p 1 (n)| > p 1 (n)) = 1.
Proof of Example 2. Suppose π satisfies Condition P(α), α ∈ (0, ∞) K . By Proposition 1, there exists γ > 0 so thatp 1 (X n ) ≥ α 1 /[2(n + γ)]. For every n > α 1 /8 pick p(n) ∈ ∆ with p 1 (n) = α 1 /(8n). Let n 0 = max(α 1 /8, γ). If n > n 0 , then α 1 /[2(n + γ)] > 2p 1 (n), and so P p(n) (|p 1 (X n ) − p 1 (n)| > p 1 (n)) = 1. Since lim sup n→∞ ζ(n)/n = ∞, there exists for every N ∈ N an n > n 0 with ζ(n)p 1 (n) ≥ N.
The following result was used in Remark 4. Proposition 2. Let K > 2 andk ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Suppose the density π of the prior distribution on ∆ satisfies Condition P(α 1 , . . . , α K ) with α 1 , . . . , α K > 0. Then the image measure induced by the mapping (p 1 , . . . , p K ) → (pk, k =k p k ) has a density that satisfies Condition P(αk, k =k α k ).
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality thatk = 1. Then the image measure has a density π 1 with respect to the normalized Lebesgue measure on ∆ 1 = {q ∈ [0, 1] 2 : q 1 + q 2 = 1} which is given by
A(q 2 ) = {(p 2 , . . . , p K−1 ) ∈ (0, 1) K−2 : p 2 + · · · + p K−1 < q 2 }. Making the change of variable t = (t 2 , . . . , t K−1 ) = q −1 2 (p 2 , . . . , p K−1 ) we get
for q ∈ ∆ 1 with q 2 > 0. Since π satisfies Condition P(α 1 , . . . , α K ), there exists a continuous positive functionπ on ∆ such thatπ(p) = π(p)/ K k=1 p α k −1 k for all p ∈ int ∆. Hence, for q ∈ int ∆ 1 ,
The integral is positive for every q ∈ ∆ 1 and, by dominated convergence, depends continuously on q ∈ ∆ 1 . Thus, π 1 satisfies condition P(α 1 , α 2 + · · · + α K ).
Proofs of the examples in Section 3.
Proof of Example 3. Let N ∈ N. For every n ≥ max(N, N c ) let p(n) = ( N n , 1− N n ), q(n) = ( N cn , 1 − N cn ), ϑ n = (p(n), q(n)), and
We will prove more than is stated, namely that P ϑn (A n ) → 0 as n → ∞. Let Y n denote the number of times the blue die lands on side 1 in the first n periods. By Proposition 1, there exists γ > 0 so thatp 1 (X n ) ≤ 3 2 (Y n + γ)/(B n + γ). For every n ≥ max(N, N c ) and b ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, by Lemma 4,
If b > n 2 µ B , then c(b+γ)/(24 1 ∨ (n − b)) ≥ d √ n with d := cµ B /(48 1 − µ B /2), and it follows that
To bound the probability on the right-hand side we use a Poisson approximation to the conditional distribution of Y n . Let W ν be a Poisson random variable with mean ν. Then, by Stein (1986) , (43) on page 89,
In the second line we used the fact that W N is stochastically larger than W bp 1 (n) because N ≥ bp 1 (n), see Lehmann and Romano (2005) , pages 67-70. Hence
As n → ∞, P(W N ≥ −γ + d √ n) → 0 and, by the weak law of large numbers,
Proof of Example 4. Let Y n and Z n be the respective number of times the blue and the red die land on side 1 in the first n periods. By Proposition 1, there exists γ > 0 so that
For every n ∈ N with n ≥ c pick ϑ n = (p(n), q(n)) ∈ ∆ 2 with p 1 (n) = c n and q 1 (n) = 1 n . Let µ 0 ∈ (0, µ B ) and µ 1 ∈ (µ B , 1). Then, for b = ⌈µ 0 n⌉, . . . , ⌊µ 1 n⌋, P ϑn Y n = 0, 6γ c < B n n Z n B n = b ≥ [1 − p 1 (n)] n P ϑn 6γ cµ 0 < Z n B n = ⌊µ 1 n⌋ . Now [1 − p 1 (n)] n → e −c > 0 and, by Stein (1986) , (43) on page 89,
where W is a Poisson random variable with mean 1 − µ 1 . Hence lim inf n→∞ P ϑn Y n = 0, 6γ c < B n n Z n µ 0 n ≤ B n ≤ µ 1 n > 0.
Since P(µ 0 n ≤ B n ≤ µ 1 n) → 1, it follows that there exists ǫ 0 > 0 and n 0 ∈ N so that P ϑn p 1 (X n ) < c 2q 1 (X n ) > ǫ 0 for all n ≥ n 0 . Since ζ(p 1 (n))/p 1 (n) → ∞ as n → ∞, there exists for every N ∈ N an n ≥ n 0 with nζ(p 1 (n)) ≥ N and ϑ n has the required properties.
Proofs of the auxiliary results in Section 4.
Proof of Lemma 1. Set ℓ = d/(n ∧ m). By Markov's inequality, for every t > 0,
P T m m ≥ 1 c ′ S n n + ℓ = P e t(c ′ Tm− m n Sn) ≥ e tc ′ ℓm ≤ E[e t(c ′ Tm− m n Sn) ] e tc ′ ℓm .
We will determine a suitable value for t so that the expectation is at most 1. Let ξ and τ be Bernoulli variables with P(ξ = 1) = p and P(τ = 1) = q. Then (15) E[e t(c ′ Tm− m n Sn) ] = E(e tc ′ Tm )E(e −t m n Sn ) = [E(e tc ′ τ )] m [E(e −t m n ξ )] n . For t > 0 and s ∈ R let ψ t (s) = (1 − s + se c ′ t )(1 − cs + cse −t ). Since p ≥ cq,
We have ψ t (0) = 1, and ψ ′′ t (s) = 2c(e c ′ t − 1)(e −t − 1) < 0, so that ψ t is concave. For t 0 := (c ′ + 1) −1 log(c/c ′ ), (14),
If m > n, then Lyapunov's inequality gives [E(e tc ′ τ )] m ≤ [E(e tc ′ m n τ )] n . Setting t 1 = n m t 0 , we get in this case E[e t 1 (c ′ Tm− m n Sn) ] ≤ [E(e t 1 c ′ m n τ )] n [E(e −t 1 m n ξ )] n ≤ 1, and so
Proof of Lemma 2. We will use a Poisson approximation to the binomial distribution. If W ν is a Poisson random variable with mean ν > 0, then P(W ν ≤ M) → 0 as ν → ∞. Thus there exists N 0 ∈ N so that P(W ν ≤ M) < 1 2 ǫ for ν > N 0 . By Stein (1986) , (43) on page 89, |P p (S n ≤ M) − P(W np ≤ M)| ≤ p. Thus if np ≥ N 0 and p ≤ 1 2 ǫ, then P p (S n ≤ M) ≤ ǫ. In particular, for p = 1 2 ǫ and n = ⌈2N 0 /ǫ⌉, we have P ǫ/2 (S ⌈2N 0 /ǫ⌉ ≤ M) ≤ ǫ.
On the other hand, if p > 1 2 ǫ and n ≥ 2N 0 /ǫ, then P p (S n ≤ M) ≤ P ǫ/2 (S n ≤ M) ≤ P ǫ/2 (S ⌈2N 0 /ǫ⌉ ≤ M) ≤ ǫ, where we used the fact that the family of binomial distributions is stochastically increasing in both parameters, see e.g. Lehmann and Romano (2005) , pages 67-70. The claim follows with N = 2N 0 /ǫ.
